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At every waking moment, one’s attention is situated along a continuum from 
experiencing, where one focuses on their immediate environment, to mind-wandering, 
where one focuses on environment-independent thoughts, feelings, and daydreams. The 
framework developed and tested in this research predicts how this spectrum of attention 
affects the relative weight consumers place on price information in their judgments and 
decisions. Six studies provide empirical support for the framework, with the core finding 
being that people in an experiencing (mind-wandering) mode systematically attach more 
(less) weight to price information. This effect stems from the price attribute’s 
characteristic of changeability, or capability for exhibiting temporal variation. People in 
an experiencing (versus mind-wandering) mode place a greater imporance on noticing 
change, and therefore subsequently estimate that a changeable stimulus (such as a price) 
is more likely to change. Such differences in beliefs of change likelihood lead to the 
observed differences in price weighting effects across the attention modes. These findings 
shed new light on the underlying psychology of attention as well as the role of price in 
judgment and decision making. 
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Imagine yourself taking a walk. As you stroll through your neighborhood, you 
focus on your physical surroundings such as the people you pass by, the cars parked 
along the curb, and the flowers planted along the sidewalk. You continue walking until 
you get to a park, all the while attending to the sights, smells, and sounds of your walking 
experience. This scenario characterizes an attention mode I refer to as experiencing, 
where attention is directed toward perceptions and cognitions related to the immediate 
physical environment. Now imagine taking an alternate walk. As you stroll through your 
neighborhood, you reminisce about an earlier chat you had with your friend, which 
quickly transitions into daydreaming about things you want to do on your next day off. 
All the while, you continue walking along the street, paying little if any attention, to the 
sights and sounds of your physical environment. This scenario characterizes an attention 
mode known as mind-wandering (Smallwood and Schooler 2006), where attention is 
focused on thoughts, feelings, and daydreams that are decoupled from the environment. 
Now imagine that both walks conclude as you see a refreshment truck selling chocolates. 
The question this research asks is: “In which walk would you be likely to give more 
weight the price of the chocolates in making your purchase decision?” Intuitively, one 
might predict that being in an experiencing (versus mind-wandering) mode would lead 
one to consider more product attributes, such as flavor, ingredients, and size, leading to a 
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decrease in the relative weight assigned to price. In contrast, this research proposes the 
precise opposite: that an experiencing (versus mind-wandering) mode leads one to more 
heavily weight prices in decision making. 
The core effect of attention modes on price weighting arises from differences in 
the way individuals across the two modes treat stimuli that are changeable (i.e., capable 
of exhibiting exogenous temporal variation), of which price is one example. Specifically, 
the model presented here reasons that because individuals in an experiencing (versus 
mind-wandering) mode place a greater importance on noticing change, they subsequently 
believe that a changeable stimulus (such as price) is more likely to in fact change and 




This research makes two notable contributions. First, it is important to note that at 
any given moment, a consumer’s attention mode is situated at some point on a continuum 
ranging from experiencing to mind-wandering, and therefore has the potential to affect 
every judgment he or she makes. However, past research in the area of attention modes 
has been conducted using paradigms which limit their generalizability to consumer 
judgment contexts. Specifically, in these paradigms, participants’ objective performance 
is assessed in tasks involving stimuli that need only be considered individually 
(Smallwood, McSpadden, and Schooler 2008; Smallwood, Obonsawin, and Heim 2003). 
In contrast, judgment and decision making contexts often involve sifting through multiple 
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pieces of information that necessitate some type of prioritization processes for ordering 
their consideration (e.g., attribute weighting models). To my knowledge, this is the first 
work to bridge this gap in the literature and study the downstream effects of attention 
modes in such contexts. Importantly, in contrast to past work, which suggests that 
processing effects of attention modes are largely independent of stimuli characteristics 
(Barron et al. 2011; Kam et al. 2010), this work uncovers a key stimuli characteristic (i.e., 
changeability) that moderates the impact of attention modes on stimuli prioritization. In 
sum, this work therefore not only identifies a novel stimuli characteristic that is important 
in both the domain of attention modes and judgments, but also highlights the theoretical 
utility of expanding the study of attention modes to the context of judgment and decision 
making. 
Second, this research makes meaningful contributions to the literature on price 
weighting in judgments and decisions. Price weighting has been studied from two 
perspectives in past research (Bornemann and Homburg 2011; Lichtenstein, Bloch, and 
Black 1988), one dealing with the role of price as a financial sacrifice (Elrod and Winer 
1982; Rossi and Allenby 1993) and the other focusing on price as a cue of product quality 
(Dawar and Parker, 1994; Rao and Monroe 1989). In both streams of literature, price 
assumes the function of a heuristic cue (of either quality or financial sacrifice), and the 
observed weighting effects have been consistent with what might be expected from this 
role. For instance, consumers who are low in product knowledge and therefore have 
lower ability to process information are more likely to weight price heavily in judging 
quality (Rao and Monroe 1988; 1989). In the domain of high-involvement products, 
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where consumers are motivated to consider many product attributes, consumers give less 
weight to prices (Lichtenstein et al. 1988). Similarly, price weights generally decrease 
when consumers are primed with broad (vs. narrow) response categories, which prompt 
consideration of more (vs. less) inputs in decision making (Chakravarti et al. 2013). In 
sum, price, which typically functions as a heuristic cue, is typically given more weight 
when consumers’ ability or motivation to consider other attributes is relatively limited. 
This research diverges from this typical characterization of price and instead studies its 
inherent characteristic as a changeable attribute. Using this theoretical backdrop, a unique 





 This dissertation is organized as follows. The remainder of Chapter I continues 
first with a discussion of the conceptual background and subsequently closes with the 
development of my framework. Chapter II then reports the findings from six experiments 
designed to test the various aspects of the framework. Collectively, the studies test the 
framework for price weighting and changeable stimuli prioritization across a variety of 
contexts, develop and use both a validated chronic measure of attention mode and 
attention mode manipulation, directly rule out several alternative explanations, and offer 
support for key propositions in the framework via both mediation and moderation. 
Chapter III then summarizes the empirical evidence, discusses the theoretical and 
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managerial implications of the findings, discusses some limitations of the research, and 




Experiencing and Mind-Wandering as Modes of Attention 
 
The wealth of information available for processing at any given moment greatly 
exceeds the capacity of the human brain. Thus, attention mechanisms have evolved to 
direct processing capacity towards pieces of information that are most relevant to goals 
and behaviors (Pashler, Johnston, and Ruthruff 2001). Collectively, attention mechanisms 
not only select pieces of information (i.e., “targets”) for heightened processing, but also 
determine the depth, length, and nature of processing for such targets (Chun, Golomb, 
and Turk-Browne 2011). 
 The targets of attention exist along a spectrum. At one end of the spectrum are 
targets that are encountered in the immediate environment through passive perceptions 
(e.g., sights, sounds, and smells; Chun et al. 2011) as well as active interactions (e.g., 
physical movements and tasks; Smallwood and Schooler 2006), that together, form 
experiences (Busse et al. 2005; Staresina and Davachi 2009). Such experiences may also 
be accompanied by experience-related cognitions such as mental computations during a 
math test (Mrazek et al. 2011), or inferences about events in a story (Smallwood et al. 
2008). Attention directed towards such perceptions of and cognitions related to the 
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immediate environment encompass what is referred to here as the experiencing mode of 
attention. At the other end of the spectrum are targets that originate independent of the 
immediate environment, such as thoughts about what one might do the next day, feelings 
about an event that occurred a week prior, or daydreams of an alternative state of present 
reality. Attention directed primarily to such stimuli-independent thoughts, feelings, or 
daydreams encompass the mode of attention known as mind-wandering (Smallwood and 
Schooler 2006). Mind-wandering has also been studied under different monikers such as 
task-unrelated thought (Smallwood, Baracaia, Lowe, and Obonsawin 2003), task 
unrelated images and thoughts (Giambra 1995), stimulus-independent thought (Teasdale, 
Segal, and Williams 1995), zone outs (Schooler 2002), and mind pops (Kvavilashvili and 
Mandler 2004). As the above terms suggest, mind-wandering may occur both when in 
states of wakeful rest and when actively engaged in tasks (Greicius and Menon 2004). 
Together, these modes capture attention towards the full spectrum of targets, from those 
originating from the immediate environment to those entirely decoupled from the 
immediate physical world. 
 Consistent with the notion that attention targets exist along a spectrum, past work 
has demonstrated that higher levels of relative experiencing reduce mind-wandering, and 
vice-versa. For example, people often miss details in a story when their mind wanders 
(Smallwood et al. 2008). Conversely, mind-wandering tends to be reduced by engaging 
in environmental interactions that lead to intense focus (Csíkszentmihályi 1990), are 
novel (Mason et al. 2007), or require high degrees of perceptual processing (Forster and 
Lavie 2009). Importantly, such countervailing effects are not limited to task-relevant 
 7 
 
stimuli, as several studies have shown that processing of task-irrelevant stimuli also 
reduces mind-wandering (Barron et al. 2011; Kam et al. 2010). Such findings therefore 
support a conceptualization of experiencing that is broader than mere task involvement, 
but rather inclusive of any target that originates from the immediate environment. Taken 
together, these works suggest that experiencing and mind-wandering represent opposite 
ends of a continuous spectrum of attention. 
Studies of neurological systems also support this conceptualization of attention 
modes. Activity in the default mode network (DMN) – a network of brain regions that 
supports mind-wandering (Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, and Schacter 2008; Mason et al. 
2007) – has been found to be negatively correlated with activity in the dorsal attention 
network (DAN) – a network of brain regions that supports engagement with the 
environment (Broyd et al. 2009; Fox et al. 2006). Further evidence is provided by Raichle 
and Mintun (2006) who calculated that total energy consumption increases by only 0.5% 
- 1% when one transitions from wakeful rest (which promotes mind-wandering) to 
responding to environmental stimuli. This suggests that the DMN and DAN share 
relatively fixed resources, and supports a bipolar conceptualization of experiencing and 
mind-wandering. 
 It is important to clarify here that an individual’s attention mode is a combination 
of situational and chronic factors. Although past work has tended to focus on situational 
variation, measurement of attention mode as a chronic trait is also predictive of attention 
mode in a given moment (Mason et al., 2007). So, one who has a particularly active 
wandering mind will be more likely to daydream even when in the midst of goal-directed 
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activity (e.g., while reading a book), while a person with the opposite tendency may focus 
almost exclusively on online processing of the external world even in the absence of a 
goal-directed activity (e.g., attending to scenery while sitting on a bench outside). Thus, 
one’s current attention mode is dictated by a combination of chronic tendencies and 
situational factors, and accordingly, the empirical methods in this research make use of 
both. 
 
Relationships between Attention Modes and Other Constructs 
 
Several other constructs in social and cognitive psychology have posited an 
“internal versus external” focus (Buss 1980; Duval and Wicklund, 1972; Carver, 1979; 
Rotter, 1954). For example, in the study of inference making and beliefs, Rotter’s (1954) 
locus of control theory posits that people may believe personal outcomes are controlled 
by either the self or an external force. In the area of attention, Duval and Wicklund’s 
(1972) theory of self-awareness suggests that people can direct attention to the external 
world or to the self, where self-focused attention involves thinking about oneself, 
scrutinizing one’s own behavior, and paying attention to one’s own features both from 
the perspective of the self and from the imagined perspective of others (Fenigstein, 
Scheier, and Buss 1975). An important characteristic that these theories share is the use 
of the self as a countervailing force against the external world. In contrast, mind-
wandering may include but is not limited to thoughts concerning the self. In other words, 
although mind-wandering necessarily occurs within the self, the self is not constrained as 
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the content of one’s mind-wandering. As examples, one’s mind might wander to the 
current activities of close others (e.g., “I wonder what my best friend is doing right now”) 
or the current state of other places (e.g., “I wonder what the weather is like in Australia”). 
In this regard, experiencing versus mind-wandering overlaps more so with the first 
conceptualization of the introversion-extraversion trait by Jung (1921) as an orientation 
towards and an interest in either the “external object” (i.e., external world) or “subjective 
psychic contents”, so long as such one’s “psychic contents” are unrelated to one’s 
immediate environment.  
Attention modes are perhaps more closely related to temporal focus, which refers 
to the extent a person thinks about the past, present, or future (Shipp, Edwards, and 
Lambert 2009; Bluedorn 2002). The mind-wandering mode is similar to past-focus and 
future-focus, as the mind may wander to memories of the past or conceptions of the 
future (Smallwood, Nind, and O’Connor 2009). However, mind-wandering here focuses 
on the amount of activity relative to experiencing rather than the specific contents of the 
wandering mind. That is, mind-wandering refers to attention directed to all types of 
internal targets that are independent of the current experience, irrespective of whether 
such targets are reconstructions or memories of the past, simulations of possible futures, 
alternative constructions of the present, or even daydreams comprised of mostly positive, 
fantasy-like thoughts. Mind-wandering, therefore, subsumes the lower-level constructs of 
past-focus and future-focus. Furthermore, although the experiencing mindset and present-
focus both capture attention to aspects of one’s current experience, present-focus also 
includes cognitions about current issues in one’s life (e.g., “I focus on what is currently 
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happening in my life”) and assessments of one’s current standing in life (e.g., “I think 
about where I am today”). Such thoughts, although directed toward aspects of one’s life 
that one may broadly regard as current or salient, are nonetheless detached from one’s 
immediate physical experience in the external environment, and in fact reflect an aspect 
of mind-wandering, not experiencing.  
Another construct that shares overlap with attention modes is task involvement. 
Indeed, task involvement is subsumed within the experiencing mode to the extent that 
one is currently engaging in a task. However, many human experiences of the 
environment exist outside of goal-directed activity, and one’s attention to such 
experiences is also included within the experiencing mode (e.g., experiencing the beauty 
of nature while sitting on a beach or noticing the details of the airport lounge and the 
people in it while awaiting your flight). Furthermore, the experiencing mode also 
encapsulates attention to targets originating from the environment that are unrelated to a 
focal task one is engaging in at a given time (e.g., stimuli-induced task distraction), and 
while attention to this category of stimuli would be considered within the confines of 
experiencing, it would  reflect a decrease in task involvement (e.g., experiencing the 
sights and sounds of a street on Times Square while crossing it or when dining at a 
restaurant, noticing the gait of the waiter, the genre of music playing, and the couple 
seated on the next table). Thus, attention modes capture a distinctly broader territory than 
task involvement. 
The notion of attention modes is also related to other constructs in the realm of 
human consciousness. For example, the concept of flow is described by Csíkszentmihályi 
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(1990) as a mental state of operation in which a person is fully immersed in a feeling of 
energized focus, full involvement, and successful in an activity that matches one’s skill 
level. Flow therefore represents a state of peak experiencing. Nevertheless, other states 
may also confer similar levels of experiencing including engagement in tasks that are 
time constrained or passive events that are highly consequential, suggesting that attention 
mode is broader than flow. Attention modes also relate to mindfulness, a state of 
consciousness characterized by attention that is open to whatever enters experience while 
remaining non-judgmental and non-reactive to what is encountered (Segal, Williams, and 
Teasdale 2002). The experiencing mode and mindfulness are similar in that both capture 
attention to the immediate experience. However, attention modes differ from mindfulness 
in that they are concerned with only the targets and not qualities of attention (i.e., non-
judgmental and non-reactivity), which are integral to mindfulness. Furthermore, 
mindfulness also includes a metacognitive awareness and acceptance of current states, 
which may include states of mind-wandering. Attention modes are therefore related yet 
distinct from both flow and mindfulness. 
Finally, attention modes also bear a superficial similarity to construal level, which 
distinguishes between concrete and abstract processing (Trope and Liberman 2010). 
Although the experiencing mode of attention includes attention directed towards 
perceivable stimuli in the environment that may tend to be processed concretely, 
experiencing also includes cognitions coupled with the physical environment that are 
abstract in nature, such as abstract cognitions that accompany the experience of a math 
lecture. Likewise, the mind-wandering mode of attention may include both concrete 
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cognitions (e.g., “how” one might present oneself at a meeting the next day) and abstract 
cognitions (“why” one might do something the next day). In these ways, construal level 
and attention modes represent orthogonal constructs. 
 
Downstream Consequences of Attention Modes 
 
It is now well established that mind-wandering during a task impairs performance 
(Smallwood and Schooler 2006). This effect has been demonstrated for a variety of tasks 
ranging from those involving only rudimentary processing such as word and font 
identification (Smallwood et al., 2004; McVay and Kane, 2009) to those involving higher 
levels of cognition such as reading (Smallwood, McSpadden, and Schooler 2008) and 
math problems (Mrazek et al., 2011). The prevailing explanation for these effects is that 
mind-wandering drains fixed working memory resources (Levinson, Smallwood, and 
Davidson, 2012; McVay and Kane, 2009; Kane et al., 2007), which are necessary to 
perceive and process external stimuli (Forster and Lavie, 2009; Smallwood et al., 2008). 
Framed in opposite terms, higher relative experiencing is associated with higher levels of 
task performance due to the increased availability of working memory resources to 
engage in processing task-relevant stimuli. 
Recent work has expanded on these ideas by positing that the external stimuli 
processing enhancements associated with more relative experiencing are not limited to 
task-relevant stimuli (Barron et al., 2011; Kam et al., 2010). Evidence for this 
“decoupling” hypothesis is given by Barron et al (2011), who recorded event-related-
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potentials (ERPs) of participants completing an oddball task in which a target stimulus 
(which requires a response) and a distractor stimulus (which requires no response) are 
presented equally rarely against a frequent background stimulus (which also requires no 
response). Importantly, both P3b amplitudes (in response to target stimuli) and P3a 
amplitudes (in response to distractors) were significantly higher  for those reporting fewer 
(vs. many) instances of mind-wandering during the task, suggesting that an experiencing 
mode increased attention for all types of external stimuli, regardless of its relevance to 
current goals, tasks, or behaviors. A notable feature of paradigms which report these 
types of findings is that each external stimulus is to be considered independently of 
others. This type of setting, however, precludes a more fine grained assessment of the 
relative tradeoffs involved in integrating multiple external stimuli, as is likely in many 
real life contexts, including judgment and decision making (e.g., attribute weighting). 
That is, it is not clear whether some categories of stimuli are afforded more priority when 
multiple stimuli are to be integrated in some way. This research identifies and proposes 
one such characteristic of the external stimuli which is likely to determine the relative 
processing priority given to it in each attention mode - changeability. The following 
sections introduce the notion of change and develop the theoretical linkages that underlie 
the proposed relationship between attention modes and the processing of changeable 
stimuli. 
 




This research studies how attention modes interface with notions of change. 
Consistent with past work on visual change detection, change is defined here as the 
transformation or modification of something over time and initiated exogenously of the 
perceiver (Rensink, 2002). Physical objects change in ways perceivable via the 
modalities: touch (e.g., change in temperature of ice as it melts), sight (e.g., change in 
activated light on a stoplight), smell (e.g., change in smell of rose as it blooms), taste 
(e.g., change in taste of a banana as it ripens), or hearing (e.g., change in the sound a dog 
makes as it barks). Changes to concepts may occur in their properties (e.g., change in 
what constitutes a price over time) or values (e.g., a change to a particular product’s price 
over time), and are also initially perceived via the senses (e.g., seeing a product’s price 
change).  
There are two notable aspects of the change definition presented above. First, it 
explicitly includes movement as a form of change. It is important to specify this 
dimension of change because many objects in the environment such as cars, clocks, and 
escalators change almost exclusively in terms of movement. Second, the current 
definition explicitly includes concepts as capable of change. Although concepts do not in 
and of themselves have a presence in the external world as do physical objects, concepts 
and, therefore, changes to them are typically rooted in some aspect of the external 
environment. For example, perceiving a change in a product’s price involves perceiving 
the change in its physical price tag. Likewise, perceiving change in another person’s 
mood state involves perceiving physical changes in their verbal responses, behaviors, and 
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expressions. Together, these aspects of the change definition help to more clearly capture 
the range of temporal variation that people encounter in their environment. 
At this point, it is also important to clarify the notion of “change” from that of 
“difference”.  Specifically, change requires a single object or concept to which temporal 
variation occurs. For example, the process of a single banana ripening as time passes 
reflects the concept of change, since a single object (one banana) has been modified 
(ripened) over time, and the original object (the banana at earlier stages of ripeness) no 
longer exists. Conversely, “difference” reflects the simultaneous presence of multiple 
objects that vary from one another at a single moment in time (Rensink 2002).  For 
instance, the presence of two separate bananas (multiple objects) in the kitchen at 
different stages of ripeness (vary from one another) reflects the concept of difference. In 
sum, difference captures variation between two stimuli while change captures variation of 
a single stimulus over time. 
To further understand change as a property of stimuli, it is helpful to think of 
stimuli as distributed along a spectrum of change. At one end of the spectrum are stimuli 
that are in the process of change while being perceived (i.e., are dynamically changing), 
such as a cellular phone that goes from an idle to ringing state. Generally speaking, such 
stimuli tend to be the most important for one to consider, since they are most likely to 
require immediate responses or modifications to planned behavior. At the other end of the 
spectrum are objects that are either incapable of change or highly unlikely to change. 
Included here are objects such as picture frames, rocks, fences, etc. Generally speaking, 
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such objects tend to be the least important to consider, since they are unlikely to require 
an immediate response or modification in planned behavior. 
Between these two extremes are changeable stimuli, which are the primary focus 
of this research. Changeable stimuli are those that have a known capacity for, but are not 
currently in the process of change. An idle cellular phone is an example of a changeable 
stimulus, as it has the capacity to ring (i.e., change), but is not ringing in the present 
moment. A banana provides another example, as it has the capability to ripen over a 
relatively short span of time, but the process of ripening is not perceptible at any given 
moment. The extent to which a stimulus is changeable is of course a matter of degree, as 
a typically unchangeable stimulus (e.g., a rock) may change under a set of most unusual 
circumstances (e.g., being smashed by a falling boulder) or over a very long period of 
time (e.g., metamorphosis). Nevertheless, what is important for this research is not a 
discrete categorization of stimuli, but rather that stimuli are distributed along a continuum 
that represents relative differences in change likelihood between them. 
 
Prices as Changeable Stimuli 
 
A key piece of this research is that prices represent a rather unique example of 
changeable stimuli in consumer judgment contexts. For any given product, it is easily 
observable that stated price values change more than stated values for other attributes. As 
examples, clothing prices are reduced during sales, airline ticket prices often change as 
the departure nears, and gas prices may fluctuate daily. Such price changes occur while 
 17 
 
stated values for non-price attributes remain relatively fixed, presumably because non-
price attributes are often integral to the definition of the product item itself. Importantly, 
the ubiquity of both price changes and price as a product attribute more generally affords 
consumers substantial opportunity to learn about the changeable nature of prices. Such is 
generally not the case for other select attributes that either are only theoretically 
changeable (i.e., are not integral to the product), or exhibit change in only exceptional 
situations (e.g., warranty terms). Note that the notion of changeability in this context 
refers to the potential for a change in the value of the attribute by the marketer in a 
consequential manner after the consumer has made a judgment or decision relating to the 
product. Thus, the definition of attribute change excludes attributes where change relates 
to modifications of the product after the purchase (e.g., the temperature of a drink or 
adjustability of a car seat). 
 
Conceptual Framework: Attention Modes, Change, and Price Weights 
 
A well known finding in the attention literature is that both perceptive and 
cognitive processes are limited in capacity, hence, attention tends to be selective, 
prioritizing items and tasks that are important to adaptive behavior in the individual’s 
current field of operation (Johnston and Dark 1986; Lavie 2006; Pashler et al. 2001; 
Swallow and Jiang 2013). All attention targets are encountered within two fields of 
human operations: the physical sensory environment or the mental world of thoughts, 
daydreams, memories, ruminations etc. Past research suggests that the importance of 
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detecting change in encountered targets tends to vary between these two fields of human 
operation. Specifically, change and its detection can become crucial to adaptive behavior 
and survival in the context of the environment, drawing attention involuntarily from both 
humans and non-human animals in this field of attention (Hagmann and Cook 2013; 
Rensink 2000). As such, it is adaptive to notice changes to evaluate and modify behaviors 
in the face of changing circumstances, such as emerging opportunities, threats and 
obstructions (Downar, Carwley, Mikulis, and Davis 2000). However, noticing change is 
less consequential in the realm of non-environment related mental processes, where the 
mental operations are simulated by one’s own mind or are self-generated (Mason et al. 
2007; Teasdale, Segal, and Williams 1995) and, hence, do not necessitate an immediate 
adaptive response from the individual. Being in such an attention mode is likely to lower 
the prioritization placed on detecting changes in encountered targets. In fact, consistent 
with this idea, past research on change detection has found the amount of attention that an 
observer allocates to the environment or the visual field (versus other processes) to be a 
critical factor in detecting changes in attention targets (Fernandez-Duque and Thornton 
2000; Rensink 2000).  
Interestingly, past research has consistently shown that people who perceive a 
particular stimulus state (e.g., change), interpersonal motive, or situational aspect to be of 
great importance are more likely to overestimate its likelihood or over-perceive it in their 
environment. For instance, recent work has shown that people who characterize 
themselves as highly vulnerable to disease tend to over-perceive cues of disease such as 
old age and foreign nationality in other individuals (Miller and Maner, 2012). Other work 
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in stereotyping has shown that those who believe the world to be a dangerous place are 
more likely to activate danger-related stereotypes when surrounded by ambient darkness 
(Schaller, Park, and Mueller 2003). Similarly, in the domain of mating, Garver-Apgar, 
Gangestad, and Simpson (2007) found that women in the high-fertility phase of their 
menstrual cycle (who would incur higher consequences from mating with an undesirable 
male), rated men seen in videotaped interactions as more sexually coercive than did 
women in other phases. And as a final example, Yamagishi et al (2007) demonstrated that 
people who were manipulated to believe the relationship with their partner in a prisoner’s 
dilemma game was interdependent were more likely to over-estimate the degree to which 
their reputation could be communicated to other potential partners. As these examples 
demonstrate, such over perception or over-estimation effects have emerged in a variety of 
domains varying in both personal involvement and levels of conscious processing, 
ranging from disease perception (Miller and Manner 2012) to low stakes games involving 
endowments of only $3.50 or lower (Yamagishi et al 2007), to even contexts involving 
relatively unconscious processes (Garver-Apgar, Gangestad, and Simpson 2007). 
The overarching rationale for these findings is simple – for individuals who 
perceive greater consequences or importance of a given stimulus state (e.g., change), the 
consequences of false positives (e.g., falsely assuming that change will happen and 
therefore preparing for it) are often outweighed by those of false negatives (falsely 
assuming that change will not occur and therefore being unprepared for it). Therefore, 
biasing errors in favor of false positives increases evolutionary fitness (Galperin and 
Haselton 2012; Haselton and Buss 2000). This research therefore adopts this logic for the 
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context of changeable stimuli, leading to the following proposition: an experiencing 
(versus mind-wandering) mode, which is likely to motivates one to notice change in their 
environment, leads one to believe that a changeable stimulus, such as price, is more likely 
to in fact change.  
Building on this proposition, this research posits that a downstream consequence 
of believing that a stimulus is more likely to change is placing a greater priority on 
considering it. An increased likelihood of change signals to an individual that the 
stimulus’s current consequences may no longer be available in the future, and as a result, 
the individual should consider whether any immediate action should be taken upon the 
stimulus. In the case of price, the more one believes a product’s price will change, the 
more consideration (i.e., weight) it should garner, since a different future price signals 
that the consequences of the current price (i.e., a certain payment amount or level of 
quality) may not be available at a future time. For example, one may choose to buy now 
if they believe a price will increase or delay purchase if they believe a price will decrease. 
Furthermore, even beyond purchase deferral contexts, the mere belief that price will 
change should lead one to consider the current consequences of the price, leading to an 
increased weight attached to it. In sum, the prediction here is that individuals in the 
experiencing mode will believe that a changeable stimulus is more likely to change, and 
therefore assign greater weight to it in subsequent perceptions and judgments. 
Since the spirit of the preceding proposition is that mechanisms designed for 
changeable physical objects are co-opted for a changeable attribute (price), it is important 
to delineate the features of the judgmental contexts that allow for such an overlap to 
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occur. Specifically, the focus here is on contexts in which consumers assume that stated 
price values accurately reflect payment prices, no pre- or post-judgment bargaining is 
available (cf., Brucks and Schurr 1990), and the consequences of future attribute values 
do not retroactively affect previous purchases (e.g., people do not believe that they will 
be refunded the difference if the price of a previously purchased product goes down in 
future periods). This work also focuses on contexts in which consumers do not have 
exhaustive information regarding price schedules, and some degree of uncertainty exists 
regarding what a given product’s price will be at a future point in time. To summarize 
these features, consumers have neither control nor exhaustive knowledge of either current 
or future prices and the consequences of future prices are not accessible. Although the 
framework as applied to prices is limited to such contexts, such contextual features likely 
represent the vast majority of situations in which consumers make judgments involving 
price information. 
With regards to unchangeable stimuli, the prediction here is that there will be no 
effect of attention mode. Recall that unchangeable stimuli are by definition incapable of 
change. Therefore, all individuals regardless of attention mode should recognize that such 
stimuli are incapable of change and consider them with similar priority. It is important to 
note here that although unchangeable stimuli in the physical objects domain are generally 
the least important to consider, unchangeable attributes may be both more and less 
important to consider depending their intrinsic diagnosticity for a judgment. 
Nevertheless, the framework predicts no effect for these stimuli in either domain.  
With regards dynamically changing stimuli, the prediction here is that there will 
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again be no effect of attention mode. Although on the surface this may appear to 
contradict the previous assertion that increases in experiencing are accompanied by 
increases in the interest of noticing change, recall the proposition that the effect of 
attention mode effect for changeable stimuli is driven by differences in beliefs of 
regarding the likelihood of stimulus change, which necessarily entails some level of 
uncertainty about the change occurring. For dynamically changing objects, however, 
there should be no uncertainty as to whether change will occur, since change is by 
definition already occurring. Therefore, all individuals regardless of attention mode 
should consider dynamically changing physical objects with similarly high priority. In 
fact, this line of logic may underlie findings in the visual change detection literature, 
which demonstrate that dynamically changing objects draw people’s consideration 
automatically (Rensink 2002; Klein, Kingstone, and Pontefract 1992). Empirically, the 
test of this hypothesis is limited to the domain of physical objects, since individuals can 
only engage in judgments involving attributes with static values. In sum, the prediction is 
that attention mode will have no effect on the consideration of either unchangeable or 
dynamically changing stimuli. 
To summarize the framework, attention modes should exert differential effects on 
the prioritization of stimuli, depending on where such stimuli lie on the spectrum of 
change. There should be no effect of attention mode for either unchangeable stimuli or 
dynamically changing stimuli. However, attention mode should modulate the 
prioritization of changeable stimuli, with experiencing leading to greater prioritization of 
these stimuli as opposed to mind-wandering. This effect should hold for both physical 
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objects as well as concepts (e.g., prices). Furthermore, differential beliefs that the 
changeable stimulus will in fact change should underlie the effect. In the subsequent 





In this chapter, the proposed framework is tested in a six studies. Collectively, the 
first three studies test the basic proposition that attention mode alters the prioritization of 
changeable objects as well as prices, which are unique examples of changeable stimuli in 
decision making. Following this, the fourth study then delves into the underlying 
mechanism by testing whether differences in beliefs about whether a changeable stimulus 
(i.e., a price) will in fact change drives the observed effects. In the final two studies, the 
effect is then extended to two different contexts (quality judgments and preference 
formation), and alternative explanations regarding price diagnosticity and task 




The objective of this study is to provide a test of the framework in a basic context 
(object encoding) using stimuli that span the entire spectrum of change. In this study, 
participants were exposed to a collage comprised of unchangeable, changeable, and 
dynamically changing objects and tested on their recognition memory for the objects. The 
prediction is that people in an experiencing (versus mind-wandering) mode will attach 
more priority on encoding and therefore be more likely to correctly report having 
previously seen changeable objects. Moreover, there should be no effect of attention 
mode for either unchangeable objects or dynamically changing objects. 
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The inclusion of physical objects across the spectrum of change also implies a 
specific pattern of means predicted by the framework. That is, if people in an 
experiencing mode believe the changeable stimuli are more likely to in fact change, then 
they should encode changeable stimuli at a high level, similar to that of dynamically 
changing stimuli and higher than that of unchangeable stimuli. As well, if people in a 
mind-wandering mode believe the changeable stimuli are less likely to change, then they 
should encode changeable stimuli at a low level, similar to that of unchangeable stimuli 
and below that of dynamically changing stimuli. Put simply, the prediction is that people 
in an experiencing mode will treat changeable stimuli like dynamically changing stimuli, 





Development of Stimuli. The first task was to identify objects that were suitable 
for the collage. For the dynamically changing stimuli, four animated pictures were chosen 
(walking man, moving car, flashing stoplight, and turning Ferris wheel). Several pretests 
of static pictures were then conducted to select four unchangeable objects and four 
changeable objects. One hundred twelve people were asked how capable each of several 
objects (depicted in pictures) were of change (1 = not at all capable of change; 7 = very 
capable of change). A bunch of bananas (M = 5.08), a cellular phone (M =4.86), a dog 
(M =5.91), and an alarm clock (M = 4.88) were selected as the changeable objects (all 
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means significantly above midpoint of scale, all ts(111) > 4.24, all ps < .001). A picture 
frame (2.11), a stack of saltine crackers (3.22), a stuffed teddy bear (1.97), and a 
notebook (2.54) were selected as the unchangeable objects (all means significantly below 
midpoint of scale, all ts(111) > 4.41, all ps < .001). Twenty eight participants in a second 
pretest then rated how familiar they were with each object (1 = not at all familiar, 7 = 
very familiar). No differences between the unchangeable and changeable objects emerged 
(MUnchangeable = 6.44, MChangeable = 6.50, t(27) = .76, p > .45).  
Measure of Attention Mode. To avoid disruptions associated with thought reports 
administered in the moment, attention mode was measured as a dispositional variable 
(Mason et al. 2007). Measurement has been the predominant approach to studying mind-
wandering (see Smallwood and Schooler 2006 for a review); the incumbent dispositional 
scale being the daydreaming frequency subscale (DFS) of the Imaginal Processes 
Inventory (Singer and Atrobus 1972). However, because the DFS was not originally 
developed with the current conceptualization of attention modes in mind, it is limited in 
that it captures only daydreaming (a generally positive subset of mind-wandering) and 
also does not explicitly assess higher degrees of experiencing. To address these concerns, 
the incumbent measure was refined and expanded upon by adding items adapted from 
measures of related constructs (e.g., the acting-with-awareness subscale of Baer et al.’s 
2006 questionnaire) to more completely capture the full spectrum of attention.  
The adapted measure, termed henceforth as the EvMW (items listed in Appendix 
A) was subsequently tested for its reliability and validity. In an administration of the 
scale to 223 participants recruited on Amazon mTurk, the EvMW showed high internal 
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consistency ( = .86), and all the items loaded onto a single factor. A subsequent pretest 
(n = 54, conducted in two sessions three weeks apart), assessed whether the EvMW was 
better able to capture experiencing and mind-wandering in the moment than the 
incumbent DFS. In the first session, participants completed both the EvMW and the DFS. 
In the second session, participants were asked to replicate a circle repeatedly for 
approximately 3-4 minutes to ostensibly measure their drawing accuracy. After the 
drawing task, state attention mode was measured using two 11-point items (how much 
did your mind wander away from the drawing task? (reverse coded); rate the extent to 
which your mind was focused entirely on the task), which were anchored by “not at all/ 
very much”, r = -.80, p <.001. Finally, to assess the EvMW’s test-retest reliability, 
participants completed the EvMW scale in time 2 as well. Correlation analyses between 
EvMW at time 1 (α = .83) and time 2 (α = .87) revealed high test-retest reliability (r = 
.84, p < .001). Importantly, the reported attention mode during the circle drawing task 
was significantly correlated with the EvMW assessed three weeks earlier (r = .35, p < 
.01) but not with the DFS measure assessed at the same time (r = -.18, p > .19). Indeed, 
when the state attention mode at time 2 was simultaneously regressed on both the EvMW 
and DFS, the coefficient for EvMW was significant (b = .37, t(51) = 2.33, p < .03), while 
that for the DFS was not (b = .05, t(51) =.28, p > .77).  
A final pretest was conducted to confirm that the measure also captured attention 
to non-task related aspects of the physical environment. Seventy-four participants 
completed the EvMW scale (α = .92) followed by a five-minute filler survey. Afterwards, 
participants reported how much they attended to the border surrounding the survey 
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measures (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). As predicted, EvMW was significantly 
correlated with attention to the border (r = .23, p < .05), and notably, this occurred even 
in the presence of a salient focal task. Attention mode was assessed in the main study 
using this EvMW measure.  
Main Study. Participants read that they would be doing a pictures task in which 
they would view a collage of pictures and answer questions about it. Each participant had 
seven seconds to view the 12-object collage. The collage (shown in Appendix B) was 
comprised of the four unchangeable objects, four changeable objects, and four 
dynamically changing objects that were chosen through the aforementioned pretests.  
Participants were then presented with a series of 24 pictures and asked to indicate 
whether each picture was in the collage (yes/no). The 12 pictures in the collage were 
intermixed with 12 foils (four in each category of unchangeable objects, changeable 
objects, and dynamically changing objects). The dependent measure was the number of 
times the participant correctly answered “yes” to a picture that was in the collage. The 
logic here is that the more priority one places on encoding an object, the more likely one 
will be to correctly indicate that the picture was in the collage. At the end of the study, 
participants reported their age and gender, both of which are used as covariates in 
analyses for this and all other studies in this paper. 
 
Results 
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To test the hypotheses, a mixed effects model was estimated with the number of 
correctly identified collage objects as the dependent measure, EvMW (α = .89) as a 
continuous independent measure, and object type as a repeated measure. In addition to 
age and gender, the number of incorrect foil responses in each category was also included 
as a covariate in the model. Since the mixed effects model allows for the incorrect foil 
responses to be inserted as a category-specific covariate, this controls for the possibility 
that the results were driven by differences in false responses across categories. There was 
a significant effect of object type (F(2, 203) = 3.70, p < .03), but not EvMW (F(1, 190) = 
.22, p > .63). More importantly, there was a significant two-way interaction (F(2, 203) = 
3.23, p < .05), as depicted in figure 1.  
 
[insert figure 1 about here] 
 
The interaction was decomposed by estimating the simple slopes of EvMW for 
each object type and conducting a spotlight analysis by comparing the simple effects of 
object type at +/- 1 standard deviation of the EvMW mean. As predicted, experiencers 
correctly identified more changeable objects from the collage than did mind-wanderers 
(β= .12, t(206) = 2.08, p < .04). This effect was not present for either unchangeable 
objects as (β = -.05, t(206) = -.86, p > .39), or dynamically changing objects (β = -.02, 
t(206) = -.41, p > .68). Further evidence for the framework is given by the spotlight 
analyses. Experiencers recalled more changeable objects than unchangeable objects 
(MChangeable = 3.47 vs. MUnchangeable = 3.21, t(209) = 2.65, p < .01), but there was no 
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difference in their recall between changeable objects and dynamically changing objects 
(MChangeable = 3.47 vs. MDynamic = 3.55, t(206) > .39). Conversely, mind-wanderers showed 
no differences in their recall between changeable objects and unchangeable objects 
(MChangeable = 3.24 vs. MUnchangeable = 3.30, t(205) < 1, ns), but they did recall fewer 
changeable objects than dynamically changing objects (MChangeable = 3.24 vs. MDynamic = 




 This study confirms the predictions of the proposed framework in the domain of 
physical objects. Compared to mind-wanderers, experiencers correctly identified more 
changeable objects, as experiencers presumably placed a higher priority on encoding 
changeable objects. Importantly, the emergence of no difference in the recall of 
dynamically changing objects (which had the highest overall recall) between experiencers 
and mind-wanderers suggests that the effect is not driven by increased prioritization of 
the most important/diagnostic or salient stimuli encountered. Furthermore, there is also 
no effect for unchangeable objects, stimuli for which one would predict differences if the 
results were driven by mere differences in task involvement. Instead an effect emerged 
only for stimuli that are changeable, as the framework predicts. 
The pattern of means is also consistent with the proposed mechanism. 
Specifically, experiencers treated changeable objects as if they were relatively more 
likely to change by encoding changeable objects at a high level and similar to that of 
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dynamically changing objects, which are in fact changing in the moment. Conversely, 
mind-wanderers treated changeable objects as if they were relatively less likely to change 
by encoding changeable objects at a low level and similar to that of unchangeable 
objects, which by definition are highly unlikely to change. The next study builds on these 
findings for changeable objects by extending them to the attribute weighting context that 




The objective of this study is to extend the effect to an attribute-weighting context 
involving price – a changeable attribute. The prediction is that people in an experiencing 





Ninety-six people participated in the study for course credit or as part of a larger 
research session for $6. This study was a 6 (attribute) x (attention mode) mixed design, 
with attribute as a within-subjects factor and attention mode as a measured trait variable. 
Participants read that they would be viewing advertisements and were asked to form an 
impression of the depicted products. Participants then viewed three ads for six seconds 
each. After viewing each ad, participants were asked to imagine that they were in the 
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market for a product in the corresponding category, and to rate whether they would 
consider buying the featured product (1 = definitely not consider buying; 5 = definitely 
consider buying). The second ad was for an ergonomic office chair and was the target ad. 
It included a picture of the chair and listed six attributes in the following order: (1) brand 
(Office Depot) (2) price ($249), (3) extended lumbar support, (4) mesh back and seat, (5) 
adjustable arm-rests, back, and seat, and (6) stainless steel wheels (copy of ad provided in 
Appendix C). In a pretest, 54 students who were shown the ad rated the price as highly 
changeable (1 = not at all likely to change; 7 = very likely to change; M = 5.72, t(53) = 
9.36, p < .001); ratings for all other attributes were significantly lower (all p’s < .05), and 
at least directionally below the midpoint of the scale (wheel materials, M = 3.7, t(53) = -
1.66, p < .11; all others, ps < .005). After viewing the ads, participants completed the 
attribute weighting measures for only the target ad. The first measure asked participants 
to allocate 100 points across the six attributes, based on the weight they gave to each in 
their purchase consideration. The second asked them to rate how important each attribute 
was in their judgment (1 = not at all important; 7 = very important). Finally, participants 




A preliminary regression model showed that there was no effect of EvMW (α = 
.83) on whether participants would consider buying the office chair (b = -.07, t(92) = -
.68, p > .49). The weight and importance measures were highly correlated for each 
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attribute (all rs > .43, all ps < .001), and were therefore standardized and averaged within 
each attribute to form an attribute weight index for each attribute. A mixed effects model 
was estimated with attribute weight as the dependent measure, EvMW as a continuous 
independent measure, and attribute as a repeated measure. There was a significant main 
effect of attribute (F(5, 173) = 4.68, p < .001) but not of EvMW (F(1, 572) = 2.67, p > 
.10). The omnibus attribute-by-EvMW interaction was significant (F(5, 173) = 4.91, p < 
.001). Confirming the core prediction, the slope of EvMW when price was coded as the 
reference category was positive and significant (β = .28, t(95) = 3.01, p < .01), indicating 
that experiencers assigned more weight to the price attribute than did mind-wanderers. To 
counterbalance this effect, experiencers assigned less weight to the lumbar support (β = -
.26, t(95) = -2.67, p < .01), seat and back materials (β = -.19, t(95) = -2.01, p < .05), and 
adjustability (β = -.23, t(95) = -2.54, p < .02) than did mind-wanderers. There were no 
significant effects of EvMW for either the wheel materials or brand name (both ts(95) < 
1, ns). A graph of these effects computed at +/- 1 standard deviation of the mean of 
EvMW is depicted in figure 2. 
 




These findings extend the applicability of the framework from physical objects to 
attributes. This study found that experiencers attached more weight to the price attribute 
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in their product judgment than did mind-wanderers. It is posited that this effect occurs 
because prices are a changeable attribute, and experiencers, as compared to mind-
wanderers, believed that the price was more likely to change. It is important to note that 
although this pattern of results is consistent with the proposed framework based on 
stimulus changeability, it is inconsistent with and in fact opposite of what might be 
expected on the basis of task involvement based explanations (i.e., if mind-wanderers 
were posited to have lower task involvement than experiencers). Specifically, a heuristic 
input like price would be expected to garner more weight in lower (corresponding to 
mind-wandering) versus higher task involvement (corresponding to experiencing) 
conditions, given the higher tendency of consumers to use salient cues such as price 
(Petty and Cacioppo 1986; Rao and Monore 1988) as well as decision strategies which 
overweight few important attributes (Hoyer 1984; Gensch and Javalgi 1987; Kardes et 
al., 2004) under these conditions.  
Also of note is that the proposed framework is agnostic with respect to the 
direction of presumed price change. In this context for instance, the increased weighting 
of price based on the belief that the price will likely decrease in the future would dampen 
present purchase considerations, whereas expectations of future  price increases would 
increase current purchase considerations. Thus, the critical factor is not the presumed 
direction, but rather the mere degree to which one believes the price will change. In the 
following study, the changeability of price is manipulated to directly test whether 






This study extends the previous studies in two important ways. First, it 
manipulates attention mode to rule out any explanations local to the EvMW measure. 
Second, this study directly tests whether changeability is the underlying stimulus 
characteristic dictating the boundary of the effect. Specifically, if the effect of attention 
mode on price weights occurs because an experiencing (versus mind-wandering) mode 
causes one to believe that the value of a changeable attribute is more likely to in fact 
change, then the effect should be attenuated when prices are framed as incapable of 
change (i.e., when prices are said to be highly stable and fixed over time), since this 
should wipe out any opportunity for differences in beliefs regarding the likelihood of 
change (i.e., everybody should equally believe that price will not change). Furthermore, 
the core effect should replicate in a (baseline) condition where existing notions of price as 
capable of change are reinforced, since this information allows for beliefs to vary 




Attention Mode Manipulation. To manipulate attention mode, a priming 
methodology is used where participants are asked to read different stories ostensibly as 
part of a reading task. Four stories were developed using two different scenarios – a walk 
in the park and a meal in a restaurant (stories provided in Appendix D). One story in each 
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scenario was designed to elicit a mind-wandering attention mode, and the other was 
designed to elicit an experiencing attention mode. The stories in each scenario are the 
same length and describe the same basic sequence of events. The only difference is 
whether the main character is focused on their experience of the immediate environment 
or on stimuli-independent thoughts, feelings, and daydreams. After reading the story, 
participants are asked to put themselves in the frame of mind depicted in the scenario by 
imagining themselves back in the scenario they read and writing down a few sentences 
about what they recalled and visualized. 
A series of pretests were conducted to test the validity of the manipulations. In the 
first pretest (n = 115), each participant completed one version of the prime followed by 
the same circle drawing task and state attention measures reported in the first EvMW 
scale pretest. As predicted, participants who read the experiencing stories reported more 
relative experiencing during the drawing task than those who read the mind-wandering 
stories for both the meal scenario (MExperiencing = 7.54, MMind-Wandering = 6.26, t(49) = 2.82, 
p < .03), and the walk scenario (MExperiencing = 6.58, MMind-Wandering = 5.15, t(62) = 2.18, p 
< .04). A second pretest then confirmed that the primes also elicited differential attention 
to task-unrelated stimuli using the same filler survey border task as in the second EvMW 
scale pretest (walk scenario: MExperiencing = 4.18, MMind-Wandering = 3.10, t(55) = 2.07, p < 
.05; meal scenario: MExperiencing = 4.25, MMind-Wandering = 3.10, t(55) = 2.26, p < .03). A 
third pretest (n = 180) confirmed that the primes did not elicit any differences in mood by 
presenting each participant read one of the four manipulation stories followed by the 
Brief Mood Introspection Scale (Mayer and Gaschke 1988), where higher scores indicate 
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a more pleasant mood. As expected, there were no differences in mood between those 
completing the experiencing and mind-wandering versions of either the walk scenario 
(MExperiencing = 2.95, MMind-Wandering = 2.98, t(86) = .34, p > .73) or meal scenario 
(MExperiencing = 2.96, MMind-Wandering = 2.87, t(90) = .82, p > .41). A final pretest (n = 103; 
all scales 1 = not at all; 5 = very much) confirmed that the stories did not differ in the 
degree to which the protagonist noticed change (MWalk-Experiencing = 3.56, MWalk-Mind-
Wandering = 3.36, t(48) = .87, p > .39; MMeal-Experiencing = 3.04, MMeal-Mind-Wandering = 3.00, 
t(51) = .13, p > .89), references to the passage of time (MWalk-Experiencing = 3.76, MWalk-Mind-
Wandering = 3.64, t(48) = .48, p > .63; MMeal-Experiencing = 3.52, MMeal-Mind-Wandering = 3.54, 
t(51) = .05, p > .96), or references to the self (MWalk-Experiencing = 3.92, MWalk-Mind-Wandering = 
4.20, t(48) = 1.04, p > .30; MMeal-Experiencing = 4.24, MMeal-Mind-Wandering = 4.07, t(51) = .60, p 
> .54). In all studies using this manipulation, there were no effects of scenario type (i.e., 
walk versus meal) so the analyses always collapse the scenario type across the attention 
mode conditions. 
Main study. This study was a 2 (attention mode: experiencing vs. mind-
wandering) x 2 (price changeability: baseline vs. unchangeable) between-subjects design. 
Participants first provided demographic information (e.g., age and gender) and read that 
they would be completing several unrelated tasks. To manipulate price changeability, 
participants read an article excerpt ostensibly from Consumer Reports. In the baseline 
condition, participants read that products’ prices may go up and down several times while 
on the market, thus reaffirming the existing notion that prices are capable of change. In 
the unchangeable condition, participants read that prices have been stabilizing recently 
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and that the prices of products now typically stay the same for as long as they are on the 
market, thus framing prices as relatively unchangeable. A copy of the two conditions is 
provided in Appendix E. Participants were then randomly assigned to one of the attention 
mode conditions, where they read the associated story and completed the writing task. 
Following the attention manipulation, participants viewed an advertisement for a desk 
lamp with six attributes in the following order: (1) brand (StudioDesigns), (2) soft white 
bulb, (3) spring-balanced arm, (4) anodized aluminum construction, (5) 7-inch circular 
base, and (6) price ($59) (copy of ad provided in Appendix F). Finally, using the same 
measures as in study 2, participants indicated whether they would consider buying the 
lamp, and the weight and importance they gave to the price attribute in their judgment. In 
this study, the weights and importance of only price were measured to further ensure that 
the effect was indeed due to an aspect of price and not due to the counterbalancing of 




 One hundred seventy-three people completed the study: 47 were university 
students and 126 were participants recruited via Amazon mTurk who completed the study 
online. Preliminary analyses revealed no significant main or interaction effects of 
collection method, so the samples were collapsed. As in studies 2 and 3, an ANOVA on 
the purchase intention measure with attention mode and price changeability as between-
subjects factors did not reveal any significant main or interaction effects (all ps > .13). 
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The price weight and importance measures were highly correlated (r = .55, p < .001), so 
the two measures were standardized and averaged to form a price weight index. The core 
predictions were tested using an ANOVA on the price weight index with attention mode 
and price changeability as between-subjects factors. The only significant effects were the 
main effect of price changeability (F(1, 167) = 4.54, p < .04), and more importantly, the 
predicted two-way interaction (F(1, 167) = 6.75, p < .02), depicted in figure 3.  
 
[insert figure 3 about here] 
 
Follow-up analyses confirmed that the pattern of the interaction was in accordance with 
predictions. Specifically, people in an experiencing (mind-wandering) mode attached 
more (less) weight to price when product prices were framed as changeable (MExperiencing 
= .36, MMind-Wandering = -.08, t(167) = 2.24, p < .03), but this effect was attenuated when 
prices were framed as unchangeable (MExperiencing = -.27, MMind-Wandering = -.01, t(167) = 
1.41, p > .15). Looking at this interaction another way, experiencers significantly reduced 
the weight given to price when informed that prices were unlikely to change (MChangeable = 
.36, MUnchangeable = -.27, t(167) = 3.25, p < .01); however, there was no change in the 
weighting of prices for the mind-wanderers across the two conditions (MChangeable = -.08, 






This study furthers the proposed framework in several ways. First, the 
manipulation of attention mode contributes to the empirical understanding and robustness 
of the effect. Second, by using entirely different non-price attributes than in study 2, the 
findings of this study suggest that it is highly unlikely that the effects observed for price 
were due to experiencers (vs. mind-wanderers) systematically assigning less weight to 
some other category of non-price attribute(s), which subsequently had to be 
counterbalanced by assigning more weight to the price attribute. In fact, the only apparent 
consistency between the two studies is that people in an experiencing (vs. mind-
wandering) mode attached more weight to price.  
Third, this study cleanly demonstrates that the effect is indeed due to the 
changeable aspect of the price attribute. In a conceptual replication of study 2, people in 
an experiencing (mind-wandering) mode attached more (less) weight to prices in a 
baseline condition where preexisting notions of prices as capable of change were 
affirmed. However, this effect was attenuated when prices were instead framed as 
unchangeable. This happens because when the people believe that prices are capable of 
change (either naturally or if the belief is reinforced, as in this study), beliefs in the 
likelihood of the product’s price changing vary by attention mode, with people in an 
experiencing (versus mind-wandering) mode believing that the price is more likely to in 
fact change. However, when this belief of price as capable of change is dispelled, there is 
no opportunity for differences across attention mode to emerge, since all people equally 
believe that the price will not change. As the previous studies have robustly demonstrated 
the domain of the effect (for objects and attributes capable of change), the following 
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study moves forward by directly testing whether the proposed mechanism – beliefs of 




This study has two objectives. First, this study directly tests the proposed process 
for the effect of attention mode on price weighting by measuring beliefs of future price 
change and testing for its mediating role. Second, this study also measures and tests 




One hundred and four people participated in the study in exchange for course 
credit or as part of a larger session for $6. This study was a 2 (attention mode: 
experiencing vs. mind-wandering) x 6 (attribute) mixed-design, with attention mode as a 
between-subjects factor and attribute as a within-subjects factor. Participants entered the 
lab and completed the same attention mode manipulation as was used in Study 3. 
Afterwards, participants completed the same purchase decision task and dependent 
measures as in studies 2 and 3. The only difference was that the target advertisement was 
for an all-weather running shoe, which presented six attributes in the following order: (1) 
brand (Montrail), (2) weight (10oz), (3) non-slip treads, (4) soft shell, (5) reinforced heel, 
 42 
 
and (6) price ($109) (copy of ad provided in Appendix G). As in study 2, weight and 
importance measures were taken for all attributes. 
After completing the dependent measures, participants responded to a series of 
measures to test the underlying process. First, to measure beliefs of price change (the 
proposed mechanism), participants judged how likely it was that the company would 
change the price in the future without changing the model version (1 = not at all likely, 7 
= very likely). Next, to test whether perceptions of other forms of price variation might 
account for the effect, participants rated the extent to which they perceived prices had 
previously changed for running shoes in general (1 = has not changed at all; 7 = has 
changed very much) and varied across different models currently on the market (1 = no 
variability at all; 7 = a lot of variability). To test whether differences in emotional 
reactions to price may account for the effect, participants then rated the extent to which 
they had an emotional response to the price (1 = no emotional response at all; 7 = a 





As in studies 2 and 3, preliminary analyses showed that there was no effect of 
attention mode on whether participants would consider buying the running shoes 
(MExperiencing = 2.69, MMind-Wandering = 2.58, F(1, 100) = .40, p > .52). The weight and 
importance measures were highly correlated for each attribute (all rs > .48, all ps < .001), 
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so they were standardized and averaged within each attribute to form a weight index for 
each attribute. Attribute weights were analyzed using a 2 (attention mode) x 6 (attribute) 
repeated measures ANOVA with attention mode as a between-subject factor and attribute 
as a repeated measure. There was no main effect of attribute (F(5, 500) = .55, p > .73) or 
attention mode (F(1, 100) = .04, p > .83), but the omnibus attention mode by attribute 
interaction was significant (F(5, 500) = 2.26, p < .05), as depicted in figure 4. 
 
[insert figure 4 about here] 
  
As predicted, people in an experiencing mode gave more weight to price than 
those in a mind-wandering mode (MExperiencing = .22, MMind-Wandering = -.20, t(100) = 2.49, p 
< .02).  To counterbalance this effect, the non-slip treads attribute was given more weight 
by those in a mind-wandering mode, as compared to those in an experiencing mode 
(MExperiencing = -.19, MMind-Wandering = .17, t(100) = 2.11, p < .04). There were no significant 
effects of attention mode for any other attribute (all ts < 1, ns).  
Several mediation analyses were then conducted to explore the underlying 
process. As expected, price was rated significantly above the midpoint (4) of the beliefs 
of price change measure (M = 5.6, t(103) = 11.48, p < .001), thus confirming that price is 
generally regarded as likely to change. To test the mediating role of beliefs of price 
change in the effect of attention mode on price weight, a mediation analysis was 
conducted using Andrew Hayes’s PROCESS macro (detailed in Preacher and Hayes, 
2004). As predicted, beliefs of price change differed by attention mode (MExperiencing = 
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5.91, MMind-Wandering = 5.32, F(1, 100) = 4.55, p < .04), such that experiencers perceived 
the shoe price as more likely to change than did mind-wanderers. Finally, a bootstrapping 
analysis with 10000 samples confirmed that the effect of attention mode on price 
weighting was mediated by change likelihood ratings [95% CI: .012, .206], as depicted in 
figure 5. Similar mediation analyses performed with measures of alternative mechanisms 
yielded no significant indirect effects.  
 




 This study provides direct evidence that compared to a mind-wandering mode, an 
experiencing mode leads to beliefs that a price (an attribute capable of change) is more 
likely to in fact change, and therefore results in greater price weights. Alternative 
processes, including emotional responses to price, perceived price variability, and 
memories of previous price changes for the category were ruled out as possible 
explanations. Now that clear and detailed support for the underlying mechanism has been 
demonstrated, the following study moves forward by explicitly ruling out other 






 This study has three objectives. First, it extends the previous effects in purchase 
consideration to a quality judgment context. The use of this context is important insofar 
as it helps tease apart the findings for attention mode from those one might expect for 
construal level. Specifically, Yan and Sengupta (2011) found that a concrete (versus 
abstract) construal leads to increased weighting of price in purchase decisions, since price 
is often related to feasibility rather than desirability concerns. However, they found the 
opposite to be true in a quality assessment context, where price tends to be regarded as an 
abstract or summary attribute for quality. Given that construal level has divergent effects 
on price weighting depending on context, a replication of the previous effects in this 
setting would provide strong evidence against a construal level account and in favor of 
attention mode. 
Second, this study tests the effect of price weighting on a downstream judgment. 
This is accomplished by manipulating price and measuring perceived quality. In concert 
with the findings of previous studies that experiencers more heavily weight prices in their 
judgments than mind-wanderers, the prediction here is that for experiencers, a product 
priced relatively higher should be rated as higher quality than the same product priced 
relatively lower, whereas for mind-wanderers, such differences should not emerge as 
strongly or at all.  
The third objective of this study is to directly rule out the alternative explanation 
that the observed effects emerge not because price is changeable, but because price in 
many cases also tends to be more intrinsically important or diagnostic than other 
attributes. This alternative explanation is tested by pitting price against a less changeable 
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but even more diagnostic attribute for a product quality judgment – brand reputation. If 
attention mode alters weighting of any highly diagnostic attribute for a judgment, then the 
expected pattern of effects for price should replicate or emerge even stronger for the 
brand attribute; however, if the account proposed in this research holds, then the effect 




Development of Materials. Two pretests were used to develop the materials for 
the main study. The first pretest was conducted to test the relative diagnosticity of brand 
name versus price for water quality judgments. Sixty people responded to the following 
question: “In your opinion, what is a better predictor of the quality of bottled water, its 
price or brand?” (1 = price much better, 3 = price and brand equally good, 5 = brand 
much better). On average, people rated brand as the more diagnostic attribute, as 
evidenced by ratings significantly above the midpoint (M = 3.53, t(59) = 4.13, p < .001). 
The second pretest was conducted to select the brands and ensure that the magnitude of 
difference between the high and low reputation brands and prices were relatively 
equivalent to what would be encountered in the marketplace. Thirty-four participants 
were asked for their evaluations of several water brands (1 = very poor; 5 = very good), 
and how much they remembered paying for a 20oz bottle of each brand. Based on the 
results, the Fiji and Market Pantry brands were selected as the high- and low-reputation 
brands respectively (MFiji = 4.09 vs. MMarketPantry = 3.15, t(33) = 7.59, p < .001) and their 
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corresponding recalled prices as the values for the two price conditions (MFiji = $2.35 vs. 
MMarketPantry = $1.10, t(33) = 4.22, p < .001).  
Main study. This study was a 2 (attribute: brand vs. price) x 2 (attribute quality 
signal: high vs. low) x (attention mode) design with attribute and quality signal as 
between-subjects factors and attention mode as a continuous trait variable. Participants 
viewed a picture of a 20oz bottle of water, an accompanying description, and one of the 
four versions of the final attribute (i.e., high price, low price, high-reputation brand, or 
low-reputation brand; stimuli depicted in Appendix H). Participants rated how they 
thought the water would taste (1 = very bad; 7 = very good) and what they thought the 
water’s overall quality would be (1 = very low quality; 7 = very high quality). As 
manipulation checks, participants in the brand attribute conditions rated how good the 
brand was compared to other brands on the market (1 = very bad; 7 = very good), and 
those in the price attribute conditions rated how expensive the water was compared to 
other brands on the market (1 = very cheap; 7 = very expensive). Finally, participants 




One hundred eighty-eight undergraduates participated in the study for course 
credit. The manipulation checks confirmed that Fiji was perceived to be a significantly 
better brand than Market Pantry (MFiji = 5.54 vs. MMarketPantry = 4.24, t(90) = 5.29, p < 
.001) and that $2.35 was perceived as significantly more expensive than $1.10 (MHighPrice 
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= 5.55 vs. MLowPrice = 3.67, t(94) = 9.49, p < .001). The taste and quality ratings were 
averaged to form a water quality index (α = .77). This index was regressed on attribute 
(dummy coded as 0 = brand, 1 = price), quality signal (dummy coded as 0 = low, 1 = 
high), EvMW (α = .86), and their two- and three-way interactions. As shown in table 1, 
all terms in the model reached significance, except for the two-way interaction between 
attribute and EvMW and the gender and age covariates. Most importantly, the omnibus 
three-way interaction was significant (β = .90, t(178) = 2.46, p < .02) 
. 
[Insert table 1 about here] 
 
The interaction was decomposed by examining the simple effects of quality signal for 
each attribute at +/- 1 SD of the mean of EvMW. The stated predictions were confirmed, 
as experiencers rated the quality of high-priced water higher than low-priced water 
(MHighPrice = 4.64 vs. MLowPrice = 3.49, t(178) = 3.44, p < .001), whereas mind-wanderers 
did not show this pattern (MHighPrice = 4.54 vs. MLowPrice = 4.23, t(178) < 1, ns). Notably, 
this effect was local to the price attribute, as high-reputation-branded water was rated 
higher than low-reputation-branded water by both experiencers (MFiji = 5.23 vs. 
MMarketPantry = 4.49, t(178) = 2.36, p < .02) and mind-wanderers (MFiji = 5.39 vs. 
MMarketPantry = 3.80, t(178) = 4.56, p < .001). A graph of these results is depicted in figure 
6. 
 






This study provides additional evidence for the core proposition that an 
experiencing (as compared to mind-wandering) mode leads to an increased prioritization 
of changeable stimuli. Experiencers were more likely than mind-wanderers to use a 
changeable attribute – price – to judge the quality of a product. By replicating the basic 
effect in this context, this study provides evidence that the underlying mechanism is not 
local to a specific judgment context, but rather that the mechanism operates on a general 
feature of the price attribute – changeability. This supports the broad applicability of the 
framework across a range of judgment contexts involving price information. 
These findings also rule out several other explanations. First, they are inconsistent 
with explanations based on either the sheer diagnosticity of price or construal level. 
Second, the results for the brand reputation conditions rule out the possibility that the 
effects are an artifact of experiencers paying more attention to the materials than mind-
wanderers, as this explanation cannot account for why the effect for price did not 
replicate for brand. In the sixth and final study, the implications of this framework are 






In this study, the implications of the framework are expanded to a preference 
formation context where one option is built to be dominant on benefits and the other is 
subsequently built to be dominant on price. Consistent with the proposed framework, 
people in an experiencing (vs. mind-wandering) mode should give price a greater weight 
and therefore be more likely to switch from a benefit-leading option to a price-leading 
option. Additionally, this study further rules out mere task involvement as an explanation 




 Participants entered the lab and completed the EvMW measure. Participants then 
completed a preference formation task that was adapted from Carlson, Meloy, and Lieb 
(2009). Specifically, participants were told that the researchers were interested in 
restaurant choices, and that they would be encountering information about two new 
restaurants, which were referred to as “L” and “R”. Six attributes in narrative form were 
then sequentially presented to participants. The first five attributes (service, dessert 
selection, entrée selection, beverage selection, and appetizer selection) were worded to 
favor Restaurant L, making Restaurant L the “benefits leader” option. The sixth attribute 
– price – stated that the average cost of a meal (including one appetizer, mid-range 
entrée, and dessert) at Restaurant L is about $50, while Restaurant R is approximately 
20% cheaper ($40/meal). This information positions Restaurant R as the “price leader” 
option.  Prior to the study, a pretest was conducted to ensure that each attribute strongly 
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favored the intended restaurant. The wording for each attribute is included in Appendix J. 
After each attribute, participants rated which restaurant the attribute information favored 
(1 = Restaurant L, 9 = Restaurant R), which restaurant they preferred up to that point (L 





Two hundred and thirteen undergraduate students participated in the study for 
course credit. The seven EvMW items were averaged, with appropriate reverse-coding, to 
form the EvMW scale ( = .83). As anticipated, an overwhelming majority of 
participants preferred Restaurant L after the fifth attribute (i.e., immediately prior to 
encountering the price information). Since the objective of the study is to test the effect of 
an attention mode on switching to a price leader option, 12 participants who preferred 
Restaurant R prior to encountering the price information were screened out of the 
analysis (consistent with the analysis in Carlson et al., 2009), leaving 201 participants in 
the focal sample. Overall, 70 of the 201 participants (35%) in the focal sample had a final 
preference (i.e., preference after encountering the price information) for the price leader. 
To test the core prediction, a logistic regression was estimated with final preferences for 
the price leader (coded as 0 = final preference for benefits leader and 1 = final preference 
for price leader) as the dependent measure and EvMW as the independent measure. As 
predicted, experiencers were more likely to switch to the price leader than mind-
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wanderers, as evidenced by a significant positive effect of EvMW on switching 
likelihood (β = .53, Wald = 7.10, p < .01).   
One might suggest an alternative explanation for this result, namely that 
experiencers (versus mind-wanderers) were more likely to switch simply because they 
were more highly involved in the task and therefore noticed that the price favored a 
different option (i.e., Restaurant R) than did the previous attributes (Restaurant L). 
Follow-up analyses did not support this explanation, as a regression of the measure of 
price attribute favorability on EvMW yielded no significant effect (β = .09, t(197) =.69, p 
> .49). In fact, when including this measure as a covariate in original model, the effect of 
EvMW on switching likelihood remained virtually unchanged (β = .53, Wald = 6.06, p < 
.02). These results show that task involvement does not appear to account for the effect of 
attention modes on price weighting. 
In fact, further analyses suggested that the effects of attention mode are distinct 
from those found in previous work on mere task involvement or depth of processing. 
Specifically, past work has shown that deeper processing of strong and consistent attitude 
information leads to greater confidence in attitudes (Haugtvedt and Petty 1992). 
However, correlations between EvMW and confidence in judgment after each benefit-
related attribute were all non-significant (all rs < .06, all ps > .41). This strongly suggests 






This study demonstrates the effect in a preference formation context. 
Experiencers were more likely to switch their preference from an option preferred on the 
basis of non-price attributes to an option with a favorable price. This happens presumably 
because experiencers infer that prices are more changeable than do mind-wanderers, and 
therefore more heavily weighted the price information in their decision. Follow-up 
analyses showed that task involvement did not play a role in the results, as neither 
judgment confidence ratings taken after each benefit attribute nor perceived favorability 
of the price attribute correlated with attention mode. One might wonder why price did not 
function as a cue for quality in this context, therefore leading experiencers to more 
heavily favor the benefit leader (with a higher price) at the end. Note that significant 
information regarding quality was disclosed through the benefit attributes, which 
presumably negated the necessity to use price as a cue for quality. As evidence of this, 
ratings of price attribute favorability were significantly above the midpoint (4) and in the 
direction of Restaurant R (M = 4.89, one-sample t(200) = 8.64, p < .001). Overall, the 
results support the proposed framework, while directly ruling out task involvement as a 
viable explanation for the results. Managerially, the findings also suggest ways for 
marketers to capitalize on the effect, as the findings implicate experiencers as a viable 






Table 1: Regression Model Results for Study 5 
 
Term Coefficient Standard Error T p 
Constant 3.45 1.07 3.24 < .005 
Age -.03 .04 -.72 > .47 
Gender -.15 .16 -.92 > .36 
Attribute 2.90 1.01 2.86 < .005 
Quality Signal 3.07 1.10 2.78  < .01 
EvMW .36 .15 2.46 < .02 
Attribute x  
Quality Signal 
-4.21 1.52 -2.78 < .01 
Attribute x 
EvMW 
-.76 .24 -3.22 < .005 
Quality Signal x 
EvMW 
-.45 .25 -1.80 < .08 
Quality Signal x 
Attribute x 
EvMW 








Figure 1: Number of Objects Correctly Identified by Attention Mode and Object 














Figure 3: Standardized Price Weights by Attention Mode and Price Changeability 







































 Bootstrap 95% CI [.012; .206] 
 *p<.05 
 No other constructs mediated effect  
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Figure 6: Bottled Water Quality Ratings by Cue Quality, Cue Type, and Attention 







SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
The results of six studies converge to support the proposed framework. Study 1 
tested the framework in a basic encoding context using physical objects across the 
spectrum of change and found that experiencers prioritized the encoding of changeable 
objects, while there were no differences for either unchangeable or dynamically changing 
objects. A comparison of the means across stimuli categories showed that experiencers 
treated changeable stimuli as if they were likely to change, whereas mind-wanderers 
treated changeable stimuli as if they were unlikely to change. Study 2 then extended the 
findings into a product judgment context with price acting as the changeable stimulus and 
consumers judging whether to consider buying a product. Consistent with predictions, 
experiencers attached more weight to price than did mind-wanderers, and this effect did 
not emerge for any other attribute. In study 3, the changeability of price was manipulated 
to ensure that it was the core stimuli characteristic that allowed the proposed mechanism 
to operate. As hypothesized, the core effect was attenuated when prices were framed to 
be unchangeable, but replicated when prices were framed as changeable. Study 4 then 
provided a direct test of the proposed mechanism. Results showed that an experiencing 
(vs. mind-wanderering) mode led people to believe that a product’s price was more likely 
to change, and therefore attach more weight to it in their decision. Study 5 extended the 
effect to a quality judgment context, and directly ruled out explanations based on 
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construal level and attribute diagnosticity. Consistent with the proposed framework, 
experiencers rated high-priced water as of higher quality than low-priced water, whereas 
mind-wanderers did not show this effect. Furthermore, both experiencers and mind-
wanderers rated high-reputation branded water as of higher quality than low-reputation 
branded water, which runs counter to the aforementioned bases for alternative 
explanations. In the sixth and final study, the framework was extended to the preference 
formation context and explanations related only to task-involvement were further ruled 
out. Results showed that experiencers (vs. mind-wanderers) were more likely to favor a 
price-leading (vs. benefit-leading) option, and analysis of accompanying measures did 
not support task involvement as an explanation for the results. Across the six studies, the 
data clearly show that an experiencing (versus mind-wandering) attention mode leads one 
to believe that a changeable stimulus (such as a price) is more likely to change, and 
therefore attach more priority to considering it. 
 
CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
Price changes are one of the quickest, easiest, and most effective ways for 
marketers to manage demand and profits. As a result, price changes occur frequently in 
the marketplace and take many forms, from temporary price promotions on apparel to 
fluctuating prices for airline flights and gasoline. Although such price changes often have 
marked effects on the products to which they are attached, past research has yet to 
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uncover how the general notion of prices as a changeable attribute affects consumer 
behavior. 
This research capitalizes on this general notion of price changeability to explain 
how and why consumers’ attention mode affects the extent to which one weights price in 
their judgments. Because people in an experiencing (versus mind-wandering) mode 
attach a greater importance to their interactions with the environment, they also attach a 
greater importance to noticing change in their environment. As a result, they 
subsequently believe that a changeable stimulus, such as a product’s price, will in fact 
change and subsequently consider it with higher priority. This framework was tested and 
supported in a series of six studies using different operationalizations of constructs and 
diverse contexts.  
In addition to supporting the framework, the findings also rule out a host of 
alternative explanations. For example, one might suggest that experiencers were more 
highly involved in the study tasks than mind-wanderers and therefore were more likely to 
use particularly salient cues (such as price) in their judgments. Theoretically, this account 
runs counter to past literature, which suggests that price, as a salient cue for many 
judgments and decisions, tends to carry more weight when consumers are less involved 
(Chakravarti et al., 2013; Cronley et al. 2005; Kardes et al. 2004; Rao and Monroe 1989; 
Lichtenstein et al. 1988). Empirically, the account cannot explain why dynamically 
changing stimuli, which are arguably more salient than changeable stimuli, did not show 
the effect in study 1. Furthermore, in the pricing context, it cannot explain the moderation 
results in study 3 or the mediation results in study 4. Conversely, one may instead argue 
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that an experiencing mode leads to higher task involvement, which leads to a higher 
consideration of diagnostic attributes (Miniard et al., 1991; Petty and Cacioppo 1979, 
1986). However, this does not explain why the effect did not occur for an attribute more 
diagnostic than price (study 5) or for physical objects both less and more intrinsically 
important to consider (study 1). In addition, it cannot account for why measured beliefs 
of price change mediated the effect (study 4). Likewise, it seems unlikely that people in 
an experiencing (mind-wandering) mode systematically assigned less (more) weight to 
some unobserved category of non-price attributes, which artificially created an uptick in 
price weights. The studies were conducted using a variety of different non-price attributes 
that shared few if any relationships with each other and only price showed consistent 
effects across the studies. As well, like the task involvement explanation, this explanation 
cannot easily account for process evidence in studies 3 and 4. Rather, the package of 
evidence triangulates upon beliefs in the change of a price (an attribute inherently capable 
of change) as the underlying mechanism. 
These findings contribute to several bodies of literature. As the first work to study 
attention modes in a judgment context, the findings enable one to glean new insights 
regarding the underlying psychology of attention modes. Past work has shown that 
compared to a mind-wandering mode, an experiencing  mode enhances processing of 
environmental stimuli, regardless of the stimuli’s characteristics (Barron et al. 2011; Kam 
et al. 2010). This work shows that such findings may be constrained to rather uncommon 
contexts in which stimulus prioritization is unnecessary. In the current context, where 
prioritization is necessary, only changeable stimuli are prioritized by experiencers (vs. 
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mind-wanderers). Moreover, that the effects were found to be constrained to changeable 
stimuli allowed for the prediction, testing, and confirmation of a novel implication of the 
framework for consumers’ use of price in judgments. Future work should look to identify 
other ways in which consumer contexts can enrich the understanding of attention modes, 
and reciprocally, how attention modes can help predict other consumer outcomes. 
In this regard, the work also contributes to literature on consumer price weighting. 
Price weights have typically been addressed by viewing prices as either a painful 
consequence of consumption or as a summary cue of product quality (Bornemann and 
Homburg 2011). This work instead views prices as a changeable attribute, and shows that 
this view sheds light on unique and theoretically counterintuitive relationships between 
attention and price weights. Moreover, the findings also demonstrate the capability of this 
new view of prices to predict price weighting in both price sensitivity and quality 
judgment contexts, where past work has often shown divergent effects (e.g., Bornemann 
and Homburg 2011; Yan and Sengupta 2011). Future work should continue to investigate 
how the mere changeability of price relates to both price weighting as well as other 
consumer factors. 
Moving beyond theory, there are multiple ways one can imagine harnessing these 
findings in practice. For marketers, these findings suggest that favorable prices should be 
communicated in promotional materials likely to be encountered while in an experiencing 
mode (e.g., during sales presentations) versus those likely to be encountered while in a 
mind-wandering mode (e.g., seeing an advertisement while casually flipping through a 
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magazine). For consumers, the findings suggest that reducing instances of mind-
wandering may be an effective way to stay within spending goals. 
A likely question here is whether one can tease apart which attention mode (i.e., 
experiencing or mind-wandering) drives the results. Recall that although study 5 showed 
that a baseline condition exhibited results similar to the experiencing condition, attention 
modes reflect positions along a continuum of attention along which an individual, at any 
moment, can be located. As such, there is no true “control condition” or baseline level for 
attention modes that one may use for a control condition. In support of this position, 
Killingsworth and Gilbert (2010) found that people spend approximately 50% of their 
time in each mode. As well, this research was interested in how the attention modes shift 
beliefs about the likelihood of change and how such beliefs might carry over to attribute 
weighting, not on identifying which mode appeared to calibrate one to some objective 
measure of change likelihood better than the other. Future research may examine such 
issues using paradigms in which changeable stimuli actually exhibit controlled rates of 
change. 
 Price weighting is clearly a topic of great importance to marketers, consumers, 
and decision researchers. This work uncovers how price shares a common characteristic 
with aspects of the physical world – changeability. As a result, this work shows that 
cognitive mechanisms designed for handling changeable objects are co-opted for the 
handling of price. Future work should seek to uncover other ways in which consumers’ 
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APPENDIX A – EvMW MEASURE ITEMS 
 
1. When engaged in an activity, my attention tends to remain focused on what I’m 
doing, without really wandering off in other directions, such as my thoughts or 
feelings or daydreams. 
2. I notice the details in my current realm of experience and activity 
3. My attention is focused more on what I am doing and experiencing as opposed to 
what I am thinking, feeling, and imagining 
4. My mind is often distracted by thoughts or feelings about things that are not relevant 
to what I’m doing at the time* 
5. My mind easily wanders away from what I am currently engaged in doing or 
experiencing* 
6. I find myself getting lost in my internal thoughts or feelings* 
7. I don’t pay attention to what is going on in what I’m doing because I’m daydreaming, 
worrying, or otherwise distracted* 
 
*Reverse-coded 





APPENDIX B – COLLAGE OF PICTURES USED IN STUDY 1 
 
Note: Pictures in boxes were animated to depict dynamically changing objects. Boxes not 















APPENDIX D – PRIMING MANIPULATIONS USED IN STUDY 3 AND 4 
 
Experiencing – Walk 
 
Imagine yourself taking a walk in the park. As you stroll, you start to get into the 
different things you’re experiencing. You notice your stride. It’s not too fast, or too slow; 
you’re moving at a leisurely pace. You notice the color of the leaves on the trees, the 
texture of the grass, and how the clouds are slightly blocking the sun. The air smells fresh 
and birds are chirping, just like it is after a spring rain.  
 
You spot a bench nearby and decide to take a seat. The bench feels slightly lopsided. You 
look under the bench and see that one of the legs of the bench has really sunk into the 
ground. As you sit some more and get in touch with your surroundings, you hear the 
sound of an airplane passing overhead. Just then, a family who is also out for a stroll 
passes by, and you can’t help but pick up on the smallest details as they walk by. The 
father’s hair is slightly graying, but more so on the sides than the back. He is holding a 
basket and a blanket, as if they had gone for a picnic. The young daughter is holding on 
tightly to her baby brother’s stroller as her mother pushes it.  
 
Eventually, you get up and continue walking. You focus on walking a bit faster now, 
since it has gotten a bit colder outside. You notice that you are starting to catch up to the 
family you saw earlier, but now the father is carrying the younger daughter. You feel like 
you are completely in the moment, like nothing else seems to matter except what you’re 
experiencing right now. 
 
Mind-Wandering - Walk 
 
Imagine yourself taking a walk in the park. As you stroll, you start going through what 
you need to pick up at the grocery store later. Snacks. Bread. Some fruits. Cereal. 
No...scratch cereal. You should probably finish the ones you have at home first. You get 
the nagging feeling that you’re forgetting something. Oh right…paper towels. 
Hmm...what should you do after the grocery store? Maybe you’ll just stay home, put your 
feet up, and watch some TV.  
 
You take a seat on a bench to think about what is usually on this night of the week. You 
remember a couple things you could watch. Oh wait, that new show is premiering tonight 
- the one with the funny preview commercials. You make a mental note to be home from 
the grocery store before it starts. Just then, a family who is also out for a stroll passes by 
you. You don't notice anything about them but it does trigger thoughts about your family. 
You wonder what it would be like to watch the show tonight with them. It seems like a 
show they would like too. You start to think about the shows that you used to watch with 




Eventually you get up to continue walking. Hmm maybe you’ll pick up a treat at the 
grocery store too, like a candy bar or ice cream. This whole time, it feels like your mind 
has been off in another world. In fact, you haven’t even realized how much ground 
you’ve covered or the different things that you’ve passed by. You’ve been so focused on 
your thoughts, feelings, and daydreams.  
 
Experiencing - Meal 
 
Imagine yourself at a restaurant having a meal. As you begin to eat, you really get into 
your restaurant experience. You immerse yourself in the food, which is still piping hot. 
Actually, you can still feel the steam emanating from the food as it hits your cheeks. It is 
fragrant, but not overly pungent. You unroll the napkin and put it on your lap. As you 
take your first bite, you notice the contrast between the different flavors in the dish. Some 
pieces are a bit sweet, others more savory, and there are slight notes of spiciness in the 
side dish. You feel the different textures in your mouth, and recognize each component as 
it hits your pallet. 
 
As you continue eating, you also take a few moments to take in the environment of the 
restaurant. The theme is modern – the dining furniture has clean lines, the wall décor is 
abstract, and the colors are simple and bold. The centerpiece at your table is a white 
orchid in a tall vase. There is also some jazz music playing softly in the background, so 
softly that it is hard to make out amidst the other sounds in the restaurant. A lot of these 
sounds come from the kitchen, where you hear the chef talking to his line cooks, and the 
occasional sizzle of food hitting the grill. You continue to experience the flavors, 
textures, and aromas of your food, but your senses have adapted to them, so they don’t 
seem as intense as they were when you first started eating. 
 
As you come to the end of your meal, you realize that you’ve been so captivated by your 
experience that you haven’t at all daydreamed or thought about anything else. In fact, it 
feels like all this time you’ve spent eating has just whizzed by in the blink of an eye, as 
you’ve been immersed in your experience. 
 
Mind-Wandering – Meal 
 
Imagine yourself at a restaurant having a meal. As you begin to eat, you think back to the 
last time you had this dish. It was a couple visits ago when you were here with your best 
friend. You think back to that dinner and all the things you two talked about that night. It 
had been awhile since you two had seen each other so there was a lot of catching up to 
do. You remember what your friend ordered that night. It looked pretty good. Maybe 
you’ll get that next time you’re here. Hmm…when would that be anyway? Oh right, you 





As you continue eating, you start to think about what you might do after you leave the 
restaurant today. Maybe you’ll stop by the mall and finally buy that pair of shoes you’ve 
been eyeing for awhile. You’ve looked at them twice, no wait…three times already. You 
go through all the expenses you have this month. You have some wiggle room for new 
shoes. Just then, you remember that you also need to pick up some milk on the way 
home; you ran out yesterday. Maybe you’ll just get it at the grocery store close to your 
place. It’s a bit more expensive than the one you usually go to but it’s on the way home 
from the mall. You think about the last time you were in the store by your place. You had 
trouble finding something; the layout is so confusing. 
 
As you come to the end of your meal, you realize that your mind has been off in another 
world this whole time. In fact, it feels like all this time you’ve spent eating has just 
whizzed by in the blink of an eye, as you’ve been immersed in your thoughts, feelings, 
and daydreams. 
 
Second part of prime completed by all participants 
 
A moment ago, you read a scenario and were asked to put yourself in the frame of mind 
depicted in the scenario. Now we would like you put yourself back in that frame of mind. 
Imagine yourself back in the scenario you read. After taking a few moments to visualize 
it again, please write a few sentences about what you recalled and visualized in the 





APPENDIX E – PRICE CHANGEABILITY MANIPULATION USED IN STUDY 
3 
 
Changeable Condition (Control) 
 
 
Economists have been discovering that market prices of consumer products have 
been fluctuating over the past few years. "Most products tend to change prices many 
times while they are on the market," says Jason Foster, a pricing trends expert at 
Consumer Reports. "Take airline flight prices for example. People see them go up and 
down wildly based on the market. And they used to before too."  
 
Other experts seemed to strongly support Foster's observations. "This trend seems 
to be true for almost all the product categories that we've looked at, from apparel to 






Economists have been discovering that market prices of consumer products have 
been stabilizing over the past few years. "These days, most products tend to stay the same 
price for as long as they are on the market," says Jason Foster, a pricing trends expert at 
Consumer Reports. "Take airline flight prices for example. People used to see them go up 
and down based on the market. And they still do, just not nearly as much as they used to."  
 
Other experts seemed to strongly support Foster's observations. "This trend seems 
to be true for almost all the product categories that we've looked at, from apparel to 
electronics to furniture. A price available on one day will probably be available the next 





















APPENDIX J – ATTRIBUTES USED IN STUDY 7 
 
Attribute 1 (Waitstaff) – Favors L  
 
A local food critic has recently been to both restaurants and had this to say in his column. 
“Service at Restaurant L is excellent. The waitstaff is well-trained, courteous, 
knowledgeable, and friendly, and the service is well-timed. The chef and management are 
polite and responsive to customer requests. Service at Restaurant R is very good. The 
waitstaff is well-trained, knowledgeable, and friendly. Management is responsive to 
customer needs.” 
 
Attribute 2 (Desserts) – Favors L  
 
The Restaurant L dessert menu includes several different gourmet pies, cakes, and 
sherberts. The pastry chefs at this restaurant also have special fruit- and custard-based 
specials that they have learned through international experience. Restaurant R’s has 
many classic pies and ice creams for dessert. They rotate their cake specials each day. 
 
Attribute 3 (Entreés) – Favors L 
 
Restaurant L’s offers a variety of entreés, including poultry, beef, vegetarian items 
(including salads), and pasta dishes. In addition, they always have two meat specials, one 
vegetarian special, and one or two pasta specials. Restaurant R’s main entrée menu 
consists of a few poultry dishes, pasta dishes, and two different dinner salads. They have 
a dinner special, which rotates between meat and vegetarian dishes. 
 
Attribute 4 (Drink Menu) – Favors L 
 
Restaurant L offers a variety of juices, sodas, teas, coffee, wines, and beers. Their 
trained drink mixologists have perfected classic cocktails and also make a menu of 
specialty cocktails exclusive to the restaurant. Restaurant R offers a selection of sodas, 
sparkling waters, coffee, wines, and beers. Their experienced bartenders have all worked 
for the restaurant for many years. 
 
Attribute 5 (Appetizers) – Favors L 
 
Restaurant L offers many appetizers, from American classics to international favorites. 
They also have a wide array of soups, breads, and starter-sized organic salads. 
Restaurant R appetizer menu consists of many choices of soups and breads. They also 





Attribute 6 (Prices) – Favors R 
 
You do some math using prices from the two menus to figure out how much the meal 
might cost. You compute the average cost for dinner at Restaurant L assuming one 
appetizer, a mid-range entrée, and dessert as being roughly $50 per person. You do the 
same for Restaurant R and discover that it is roughly 20% cheaper, with the average 
cost being roughly $40. 
 
